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Abstract
Medicaid is a government programme that also provides health insurance
to the elderly who have few assets and either low income or catastrophic
health care expenses. We ask how the Medicaid rules map into the reality
of Medicaid recipiency, and we ask what other observable characteristics are
important to determine who ends up on Medicaid. The data show that both
singles and couples with high retirement income can end up on Medicaid
at very advanced ages. We find that, conditioning on a large number of
observable characteristics, including those that directly relate to Medicaid
eligibility criteria, single women are more likely to end up on Medicaid – so
are non-white people, but, surprisingly, their higher recipiency is concentrated
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2 Fiscal Studies
in the higher income percentiles. We also find that people with low incomes
who have a high-school diploma or higher degree aremuch less likely to end up
receiving Medicaid than their less-educated counterparts. All of these effects
are large and depend on retirement income in a very non-linear way.
Policy points
 Medicaid provides health insurance to US households who are poor or
who face catastrophic medical expenses.
 Over 30 per cent of the 70-year-old singles in the bottom third of the
permanent income distribution are covered by Medicaid.
 Over 10 per cent of singles in the top third of the income distribution end
up being covered by Medicaid if they survive into their 90s.
 People in the middle of the income distribution who spend two years in
a nursing home are up to nine times more likely to be on Medicaid than
people with the same income who are not in a nursing home.
 Factors that are not directly related to Medicaid eligibility are very
important determinants of Medicaid recipiency. For example, ceteris
paribus, single women with low income have a higher probability of
receiving Medicaid than other people with low income.
I. Introduction
Medicaid is a means-tested programme that helps to cover the cost of medical
goods and services for several demographic groups (including the elderly)
who have either low income and few assets, or assets and income that are
swamped by catastrophic medical conditions. Its key rules are thus based on
assets, income and large medical expenses.
In 1999, 4.87 million enrolled individuals aged 65 and older received an
average benefit amount of $12,360, while in 2010 there were 6.36 million
elderly individuals enrolled into Medicaid, receiving an average benefit of
$12,420 (in 2014 dollars). Although the number of individuals covered by
Medicaid is smaller than for young families with children, the average benefit
is much bigger. Yet Medicaid for the elderly has been relatively little studied.
Given the ever-present pressure on government budgets and the increasing
costs of providing medical goods and services, we need to better understand
why people do or do not end up on Medicaid at some point after they retire.
While the programme rules for Medicaid eligibility have been reported
elsewhere,1 the complexity of the rules makes understanding of eligibility
difficult in practice. Furthermore, not everyone who is eligible takes up the
1De Nardi et al., 2012; Buchmueller, Ham and Shore-Sheppard, 2016.
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benefit. For this reason, we provide an empirical analysis of who receives
Medicaid.
The goal of this paper is to help uncover the economic forces that affect
Medicaid recipiency. We start by describing facts about Medicaid recipiency
by age, cohort, permanent income and marital status. Next, we turn to a
rich multivariate analysis, which allows us to distinguish two possible set of
determinants: rules, which concern the main Medicaid eligibility requirements
(income, wealth and large medical expenses) and other factors (including
health, age, education, race, region of residence and being in a couple). We
then measure the strength of each of these factors by keeping all of the other
observables constant.
All of our analysis uses the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data. We
find that, consistently with the goal of the Medicaid programme of helping
the poor, over 30 per cent of the 70-year-old singles in the bottom third of
permanent income are on Medicaid. However, as single people age, even the
survivors with high permanent income end up on Medicaid in their 90s. For
instance, after age 96, the fraction of singles in the top third of permanent
income who are on Medicaid is 10 per cent. Comparing singles with couples
reveals that, for similar age and permanent income, people in couples are less
likely to be on Medicaid, although the increases in Medicaid recipiency by
permanent income and age follow a broadly similar pattern for couples and
singles.
Our findings on Medicaid recipiency by permanent income are consistent
with the observation that, even though Medicaid is intended for poor
households, middle- and higher-income households with high medical
expenses might also qualify for assistance. In fact, given the ongoing growth in
medical expenditures, Brown and Finkelstein (2008) have noted that Medicaid
is increasingly covering not only the poor, but also the middle and upper
classes, and it is thus becoming more expensive to administer. In fact, the
programme also provides valuable insurance for well-off individuals.2
We also display the evolution of other key determinants of Medicaid
recipiency: net worth and limitations to activities of daily living (ADLs) by
age, cohort, permanent income and marital status. We find that couples and
singles with permanent income below the top third tend to decumulate assets
as they age and survive. In contrast, there is little decumulation of assets for
both couples and singles in the top permanent income (PI) tercile, despite the
fact that a non-negligible fraction of these individuals end up on Medicaid.
To capture large medical expenses, we study the number of ADL limitations
(which are also an important criterion for Medicaid nursing home admission),
and we find that the fraction of people with at least two ADLs increases from
less than 10 per cent at age 76, to about 60 per cent for the survivors live
2De Nardi, French and Jones, 2016a.
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beyond age 96. In addition, we also show that singles and couples who have
higher permanent incomes are less likely to have two or more ADLs (and to
end up in a nursing home or to self-report being in bad health); however, the
increase in ADL incidence by permanent income and age is broadly similar
for singles and couples.
To disentangle and measure the role of various observable factors on
Medicaid recipiency, we then turn to a rich multivariate analysis. More
specifically, we study how the probability of being covered by Medicaid is
influenced by demographic, economic, geographical and health factors, using
a logit probability model. Permanent income and other variables capturing
economic background have a major role in determining Medicaid recipiency
and in explaining the observed differences in Medicaid recipiency between
singles and couples. For instance, a 1 percentile increase in permanent income
implies a 0.4 percentage point reduction in the probability of receiving
Medicaid, the baseline probability being 16 per cent. Among the possible
family structures, being a single woman increases the probability of receiving
Medicaid, on average, by 4 percentage points. Impairments in ADLs and
residency in a nursing home have a large effect on the probability of receiving
Medicaid, as the average marginal effect of having two or more ADL
impairments increases the probability by 6 percentage points, while being
a resident in a nursing home increases the probability of receiving Medicaid
by 15 percentage points. Both of these findings are consistent with Medicaid
eligibility rules.
These findings, however, refer to the average marginal effect of each factor
under consideration. Because our multivariate analysis finds evidence for
important non-linearities in observables and their interactions, the last step of
our analysis studies the effect of the most important and interesting variables
along the whole distribution of a given variable and its interaction with other
important observables.
The interaction of permanent income and other observables related to
Medicaid eligibility is important: the marginal effect of having two or
more ADL limitations increases the probability of receiving Medicaid by 9
percentage points up to the 20th percentile of the PI distribution compared to an
increase of 2 percentage points above the 80th percentile of permanent income.
In terms of the effects of residing in a nursing home and the interaction with
permanent income, people in the 50th–70th PI percentiles who spend two years
in a nursing home are up to nine times more likely to be receiving Medicaid
than people with the same permanent income who are not in a nursing home.
We also find that other factors that are not directly related to Medicaid
eligibility are very important determinants of Medicaid recipiency, even
keeping all other observable factors fixed. For instance, white people have a
lower probability of receivingMedicaid than non-white people. The surprising
aspect is that this effect is zero or negligible for income percentiles below the
C© 2017 The Authors. Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies
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30th while it increases with permanent income and reaches 5 percentage points
at higher income levels. In contrast, single women with low incomes have a
higher probability of receiving Medicaid than other people with low incomes,
with the gap in probabilities topping 8 percentage points at the lower-income
levels. Finally, education reduces the probability of receiving Medicaid, and
especially so at low-income deciles. For instance, at the lowest decile of
permanent income, a college education reduces the probability of receiving
Medicaid by 13 percentage points compared to having less than a high-school
education.
II. Some institutional background
In the United States, there are two major public health insurance programmes
for the elderly: the first is Medicare, a federal programme that provides health
insurance to most people over the age of 65; the second is Medicaid, a means-
tested programme that is run jointly by the federal and state governments.
Although Medicaid also covers some categories of people of all ages, this
paper focuses on Medicaid recipiency by the elderly. An important feature
of Medicaid is not only that it is asset3 and income tested, but also that it is
the payer of last resort: Medicaid contributes only after Medicare and private
insurance have paid their shares and when individuals have reduced their assets
to a disregard amount. In contrast, almost all seniors qualify for Medicare.
Medicare is the main provider of medical care for the elderly and disabled,
but it does not cover all medical costs. In particular, Medicare reimburses
only a limited amount of long-term care costs, and most elderly people do not
have private insurance to cover long-term care. As a result, Medicaid covers
almost all nursing home costs of poor elderly recipients. More generally,
Medicaid now assists more than 60 per cent of nursing-home residents,4 who
face nursing-home costs of the order of $77,000 to $88,000 a year (in 2014).
Medicaid helps the elderly poor pay for other medical services as well. In 2010,
Medicaid spent $79 billion on 6.36 million elderly enrollees.5
Although the Medicaid programme requirements are established by each
state, the federal government defines some general guidelines for eligibility.
Eligibility groups include the categorically needy and the medically needy. In
the categorically needy group, the income and assets of individuals or families
fall below certain thresholds. Supplemental Social Insurance (SSI) recipients
typically qualify under the categorically needy provision, although some states
have more restrictive rules. The second group comprises the medically needy,
3See De Nardi et al. (2012) for more details on the income and asset eligibility criteria of the Medicaid
programme.
4This figure is taken from Kaiser Family Foundation (2013).
5These figures are taken from the Medicaid Statistical Information System (adjusted to 2014 dollars).
We thank Jeff Silverman and Joshua Volosov for helping to extract these.
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who are individuals whose income is above the categorically needy threshold,
but who face such high medical expenditures that their financial resources are
insufficient.
The categorically needy provision thus provides insurance to people who
have been poor throughout most of their lives. The medically needy provision,
instead, provides insurance to people with higher income and assets who are
still at risk of being impoverished by expensive medical conditions.
III. Related literature
The papers most closely related to ours study the observable factors associated
with Medicaid enrolment. Pezzin and Casper (2002) use the 1996 Medicare
Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) data to study the factors associated with
Medicaid enrolment among low-income, community-dwelling elderly people
and to evaluate the effects of Medicaid enrolment on the use of health care
services by elderly people, taking into account selection into programme
participation. They find that less than half of all community-dwelling elderly
people with incomes at or below 100 per cent of the federal poverty line
were enrolled in Medicaid in 1996.6 They also find no effects of state-level
Medicaid generosity on the probability of living in the community as opposed
to residing in a nursing home, they find thatMedicaid eligibility does not appear
to have strong effects on service usage, and they find that state-level Medicaid
generosity increases the likelihood of Medicaid enrolment. Compared with
Pezzin and Casper (2002), we not only study the panel data over a much
longer time period, but we also study Medicaid enrolment across the whole
population and permanent income, because Medicaid insurance is becoming
more appealing to middle- and upper-income elderly people.7 Perhaps, most
importantly, using the HRS data we evaluate the importance of assets as a
determinant of Medicaid recipiency, something Pezzin and Casper (2002)
were unable to do because their data did not include assets.
Gardner and Gilleskie (2012) use data from the 1993–2000 waves of the
HRS to estimate a dynamic empirical model of health insurance coverage,
long-term care arrangements, asset and gift behaviour, and health transitions
over time. Their main result is that most Medicaid eligibility and generosity
policy variables associated with nursing-home services have no effects on
Medicaid recipiency and savings. Instead, they find that policies related to
home- and community-based services have a small but significant influence,
especially on non-married elderly people with low assets. Because they found
6It should be noted that Medicaid eligibility is based on both asset and income tests and that Pezzin and
Casper (2002) do not use asset data to determine Medicaid eligibility. In addition, Meyer and Mittag (2015)
find that survey data respondents underreport support from public assistance and that these datasets thus
sharply understate the income of poor households.
7Brown and Finkelstein, 2008; De Nardi, French and Jones, 2015.
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that state-level variation in programme rules did little to explain Medicaid
recipiency, we focus on other variables. We add many more variables that
could be relevant for predicting Medicaid recipiency, including, for instance,
the number of children, and we consider the role of permanent income and
cohabitation in a much richer way. See also De Nardi et al. (2012) for more
details on state-level variation in Medicaid rules.8 Willink et al. (2016) also
use the HRS data to analyse the characteristics of Medicaid beneficiaries.
Compared with the previous papers, we use HRS panel data from 1996 to
2012, resulting in nine waves of data every two years over a long period. This
long time-span allows us to follow the evolution of Medicaid enrolments over
the retirement period conditional on a person’s characteristics, and to document
important differences by permanent income (rather than just current income)
for singles and couples. Instead of focusing on the differences across states in
the implementation of the Medicaid programme, which appears to have only
a modest effect on Medicaid recipiency, we focus on the commonalities of the
Medicaid programme in the United States. In addition, our descriptive analysis
highlights the most important aspects of assets, income, health and Medicaid
eligibility that couples and singles in different income categories experience.
Finally, our regression analysis describes Medicaid recipiency as a function of
(mostly predetermined) variables, once people’s optimising behaviour takes
place.
Our paper is also related to the work that studies the incentives to enrol
on Medicaid. At one extreme, some papers find that there is a large stigma
about enrolling on Medicaid, or an aversion to public care. At the other
extreme, other works discuss Medicaid moral hazard or strategic spend-down
of assets by people who want to become eligible for Medicaid. In the first
group, for instance, Ameriks et al. (2011) use a dataset from Vanguard
that samples individuals who have middle to high incomes and also asks
hypothetical questions to study the determinants of lack of asset run-down and
under-annuitisation. They conclude that aversion to Medicaid is an important
determinant of the observed savings patterns. In addition, Norton (2005) argues
that the elderly do not spend down to qualify for Medicaid but that, on the
contrary, some of them might actually save and/or receive transfers to avoid
becoming eligible for Medicaid. Finally, Taylor, Sloan and Norton (1999)
find that four out of ten community dwellers could qualify for Medicaid by
establishing a trust, but that less than 10 per cent actually had a trust. In
addition, for those with trusts, avoidance of probate and controlling assets was
a stronger motivation for trust creation than achieving Medicaid spend-down;
8Differences across states have been widely used in the literature to identify the effect of Medicaid
policies on the various groups covered (children, adults, disabled, and aged). Buchmueller, Ham and Shore-
Sheppard (2016) survey the literature and recommend caution in using state variation due to the limitations
of this approach.
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thus, there was little evidence of strategic trust-setting to become eligible
for Medicaid. Other works, in contrast, stress that Medicaid imposes strong
incentives for households to spend down their savings9 and not to purchase
insurance to cover long-term care,10 which thus has a large effect on both
savings and portfolio choice. Bassett (2007) and Baird, Hurd and Rohwedder
(2014) find that the self-assessed probability of entering a nursing home is a
significant determinant of the likelihood of making an asset transfer, and they
interpret this as evidence supporting strategic behaviour to achieve eligibility
for Medicaid. We do not attempt to address these questions and, separately,
we try to identify aversion to Medicaid or strategic spend-down; instead, we
study Medicaid recipiency in old age and its predictors.
Important differences in wealth, income and health have been documented
between couples and singles, and these differences point to the importance
of thinking about those characteristics when studying Medicaid recipiency.
For instance, Guner, Kulikova and Llull (2014) find that married people are
healthier than unmarried people, that this gap widens with age, and that there
is a health-protective role of marriage at older ages. In addition, the death of a
spouse has been associated with spikes in medical expenditures and with large
drops in assets for the surviving spouse.11 We adopt the insights from these
contributions when looking at Medicaid recipiency and its determinants.
There are also several papers that survey the Medicaid programme. For
instance, Gruber (2000) examines the history, rules and economic implications
of the Medicaid programme. De Nardi et al. (2012) focus on the two main
pathways to Medicaid eligibility after age 65: that is,being categorically needy
(having low income and assets) and being categorically needy (having high
medical bills). Bitler and Zavodny (2014) and Buchmueller, Ham and Shore-
Sheppard (2016) have updated Gruber’s paper after over 14 years of Medicaid
history, changes and research on Medicaid.
IV. The data
To study US retirees, including the very old, we select individuals (and their
partner, if present) born before 1924. This group of people comes from a subset
of the HRS data known as the Assets and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest
Old (AHEAD).
Data for the AHEAD cohorts were collected starting in late 1993/early1994,
with wave 2 of the HRS. However, because Rohwedder, Haider and Hurd
(2006) found that income and wealth variables are underreported in that wave,
9Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes, 1995.
10Brown and Finkelstein, 2008.
11See, for instance, Poterba, Venti and Wise (2011), French et al. (2006) and De Nardi, French and Jones
(2016a).
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we discard it and use data from 1996 (wave 3) onwards. Thus, we have a total
of nine waves, which are collected every two years, spanning the 1996–2012
period. Because we select people born before 1924, we have a distribution of
peoplewho, in 1996, were at least 73 years old, andwe follow these people over
time, until 2012. Our initial sample consists of 3,045 singles and 2,049 initially
married individuals, for a total of 5,994 individuals (see Online Appendix A
for details on the selection of the initial sample).
The AHEAD data are of very good quality. For example, De Nardi, French
and Jones (2016a) and French, Jones and McCauley (2017) show that the
AHEAD income data closely match up with income from other high-quality
surveys.Nonetheless, theAHEADMedicaid data are not perfect, but understate
Medicaid recipiency for the elderly by about 20 per cent. However, this is low
relative to the problem of underreporting of programme recipiency rates, which
has been documented in other surveys.12
We divide our observations into two groups, according to marital status.
More specifically, the first group, the singles, includes individuals who were
single at the beginning of our sample (wave 3) andwho remain single thereafter.
It also includes those who were initially married in wave 3 but became single
later, from the time they became single and as long as they are alive. The
second group, the couples, includes married individuals and people who are
in a couple as of wave 3, as long as they remain married or in a couple.
Thus, some observations will start in group 2 and transition to group 1 when
their partner dies or if the couple splits up. Hence, we show graphs for two
groups: singles and couples. Our data are thus an unbalanced panel, whose
size becomes smaller over time as people die or become single (in the case of
couples).13
We also group our data according to the year of birth to form three cohorts:
the youngest cohort includes individuals born between 1917 and 1923, the
middle cohort includes individuals born between 1910 and 1916, and the
oldest cohort includes individuals born between 1900 and 1909.14
In our graphical analysis, we also group our data according to PI terciles.
See Online Appendix A for a detailed discussion of how we measure
12De Nardi, French and Jones (2016a) find that the AHEAD data match extremely well with both the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the MCBS, and they also find that the AHEAD Medicaid recipiency
rate is 22 per cent below the recipiency rate in the MCBS. De Nardi et al. (2016b) show that the Medicaid
recipiency rate in theMCBSmatches almost exactly with the aggregate statistics. These results are especially
reassuring, given that Meyer and Mittag (2015) find that survey data respondents underreport support from
certain types of public assistance.
13About 15 per cent of women and 10 per cent of men are observed in all nine waves, with an average
yearly attrition rate of about 20 per cent for women, who are more likely to survive, and 25 per cent for men.
Overall, attrition for reasons other than death is modest. Of a total of 5,417 individuals who were removed,
1,269 left for reasons other than death.
14The oldest cohort spans a larger interval, as mortality implies a smaller number of individuals at
advanced ages.
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permanent income. Ourmeasure is non-asset income over the timewe see these
individuals, regression adjusted for changes in age and family structure using
a fixed effects procedure. Given our fixed effects procedure, our permanent
income measure is such that it does not change with age or with demographic
status (part of a couple or single) during our sample period. Most of the income
is from either Social Security or defined-benefit pension benefits. Because both
Social Security and defined-benefit pension benefits are rising with income
when working, this measure captures the concept of average lifetime income.
Online Appendix B repeats our descriptive analysis by education level, and
the comparison of the two sets of results shows that our conclusions are very
similar regardless of whether we use our measure of permanent income or
education as a measure of lifetime income.
In Figures 1–3, the numbers refer to the PI tercile (1 = lowest; 2 = middle;
3 = richest). The youngest cohort median year of birth is 1920 and it is
represented by a thick, continuous line; the middle cohort median year of birth
is 1913 and it is represented by a grey, dashed line; the oldest cohort median
year of birth is 1906 and it is represented by a thin, dotted line.
One consideration to keep in mind when looking at our graphs is that
people who are institutionalised are not included in the initial sample of the
HRS/AHEAD dataset. However, once people are in the dataset, they stay in
the dataset as long as they are alive, including when institutionalised. Because
of this sample design, it is important to mention two things.
First, the set of people that we initially observe at each age tends to be
healthier than the representative population of the same age, and this selection
is especially pronounced at older ages when the probability of being sick and
in a nursing home or hospital is higher. Second, as people in the same cohort
age, their health tends to revert to the mean to some extent, thus lessening
this initial selection problem. French and Jones (2004) and Hurd, Michaud
and Rohwedder (2014) show that the HRS/AHEAD data are representative
of the fraction of people in a nursing home by the third wave. As a result of
these features of the survey design, our cohort outcomes are different not only
because of cohort effects, but also because of the differential selection by age
and over time.
V. Some important facts
Because Medicaid recipiency depends on income, assets and health in that it
provides health insurance, in this section we show some key facts on Medicaid
recipiency, net worth and health by age, cohort, marital status and permanent
income. In Online Appendix B, we show that the results by education are very
similar to those by permanent income.
It is important to distinguish between couples and singles for several
reasons. First, important differences in wealth, income and health have been
C© 2017 The Authors. Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies
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documented between couples and singles in the US data. Second, the death of a
spouse has been associated with spikes in medical expenditures and large drops
in assets for the surviving spouse.15 More specifically, we perform our analysis
for singles (i.e., those who are single or who become single during our sample
period) and for couples (i.e., those who start out in our sample as couples,
for as long as they remain in a couple).16 This enables us to better understand
how family structure affects important economic variables, includingMedicaid
eligibility.
1. Medicaid recipiency
The upper panel in Figure 1 reports the fraction of single people on Medicaid
after age 75, by age, cohort and permanent income, and it displays several
interesting patterns. First, there is a big gap in Medicaid recipiency between
the people in the bottom PI tercile and the people in the two higher PI terciles.
The fraction of people receiving Medicaid in the lower PI tercile starts higher
at age 76, at 33 per cent, compared with under 3 per cent for the singles in the
second and third PI terciles, and it grows fast with age, reaching 60 per cent
for those who survive to age 99. Second, the fraction of survivors receiving
Medicaid in the second and third PI terciles also rises significantly, going from
3 per cent at age 76 to 25 per cent at age 99 for those in the second PI tercile,
and from 1 per cent at age 76 to 10 per cent at age 99 for those in the third PI
tercile. These findings confirm those by De Nardi, French and Jones (2016a),
even though they used different PI bins and different cohorts. Thus, although
Medicaid, as intended, is a programme that mainly helps the elderly poor, even
the elderly in the top two PI groups often receive benefits if they live long
enough.
The lower panel in Figure 1 reports the fraction of people in couples who are
on Medicaid after age 75, by age, cohort and permanent income. The fraction
of people in couples in the lowest PI tercile receiving Medicaid at age 76 is
15 per cent, which is less than half of the corresponding fraction for singles
in the lowest PI tercile; however, this number climbs fast as the survivors
age, reaching 60 per cent, as for singles. Finally, the fraction of individuals in
couples in the two highest PI terciles who are receiving Medicaid is lower than
the corresponding terciles for singles and well below the fraction for singles at
all ages.
15French et al., 2006; Poterba, Venti and Wise, 2011.
16We do not distinguish between individuals who are single at the beginning of the survey and individuals
who become single during the sample period, because we find that people who lose their spouse rapidly
become very similar – in their Medicaid recipiency and other important observable characteristics – to
people who have been single for much longer, once we condition on birth cohort, age and permanent income
as we do in the figures.
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FIGURE 1
Fraction of people on Medicaid among those who are single (upper panel) and those
in couples (lower panel) after age 75, by age, cohort and permanent income
Note: The numbers refer to the PI tercile (1 = lowest; 2 = middle; 3 = richest). The thick, continuous
lines refer to the youngest cohort (born in 1920); the grey, dashed lines represent the middle cohort (born in
1913); the black, dotted lines represent the oldest cohort (born in 1906).
2. Net worth
Because Medicaid is a means-tested programme that takes into account both
assets (or net worth) and income, and because our aim is to understand the
effect of its rules, we now display median assets by age, cohort, PI tercile
and marital status. We use the terms ‘assets’ and ‘net worth’ interchangeably
because most people at this age have very little debt.
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FIGURE 2
Median assets for those who are single (upper panel) and those in couples (lower
panel) after age 75, by age, cohort and permanent income
Note: The y-axis units are in thousands of dollars. The numbers refer to the PI tercile (1 = lowest; 2 =
middle; 3 = richest). The thick, continuous lines refer to the youngest cohort (born in 1920); the grey,
dashed lines represent the middle cohort (born in 1913); the black, dotted lines represent the oldest cohort
(born in 1906).
The first thing to notice compared with the Medicaid graphs that we have
just discussed is that people in the lowest income tercile have the highest
Medicaid recipiency and the lowest assets. Similarly, median assets tend
to be higher for people with higher permanent income for each cohort and
age. More specifically, the singles (upper panel in Figure 2) in the lowest
PI tercile enter our sample at age 76 with under $30,000 in median assets;
if they survive into their 90s, they consume all of their assets and live off
Social Security, Medicaid and other government transfers. Those in the
C© 2017 The Authors. Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies
14 Fiscal Studies
second PI tercile start out age at 76 with median assets just above $120,000,
which also gradually decline for the survivors to $15,000 once they reach
their late 90s. Finally, the singles in the highest income tercile start out at
age 76 with $320,000 in median assets and also spend down their savings,
but they still hold almost $200,000 in their late 90s. These findings also
confirm those by De Nardi, French and Jones (2010), who also pointed to
the importance of out-of-pocket medical expenses in generating these savings
patterns.17
Turning to couples, the lower panel of Figure 2 reports median household
assets for males in couples after age 75, by age, cohort and permanent income.
Because net worth is only measured at the household level, we plot the net
worth of male individuals to avoid duplicating the same family unit. There
are several things worth noticing. First, couples tend to start out in our sample
withmore household assets than their single counterparts. For instance, couples
with the lowest permanent income level start out in our sample at age 76 with
$75,000 in median net worth, which they largely exhaust if they survive into
their mid-90s. Singles in the same group start out with $30,000, which also
declines to zero by the same age. Second, with the exception of those in the
lowest PI tercile, couples also tend to holdmore assets as they age. For instance,
couples in the highest income tercile start out with over $470,000, compared
with $320,000 for singles, and the survivors still hold $420,000 at age 95,
compared with just above $230,000 for singles. Thus, although couples do not
start out with twice asmuch in assets as singles, those in the two highest income
terciles who survive with their spouse to very old ages have almost twice the
assets of the surviving singles. In contrast, couples with low permanent income
seem to rely on government transfers as much as singles once they reach a
very advanced age.
Online Appendix C reports the graphs for median wealth when the main
residence is excluded from net worth. They show that median liquid assets of
those in the lowest PI tercile are zero at age 76 and remain at zero for both
couples and singles. In contrast, the liquid assets of those in the highest PI
tercile start out high at age 76, remain substantial at very advanced ages, and
exhibit less decumulation by couples than by singles.
17After someone dies, the HRS/AHEAD follows up with the spouse, children or executor of the estate to
discoverwhatwas left of the decedent’s assets. Previous literature has pointed out two important observations
in this regard. First, people can incur large medical expenses in the period before death; see, for instance,
Marshall, McGarry and Skinner (2011) and French et al. (2006). Second, it appears that assets drop before
death for reasons that go beyond medical expenses and that are not yet completely understood; see, for
example, French et al. (2006) and Poterba, Venti and Wise (2011). For these reasons, to have a complete
picture of someone’s net worth, it is important to take into account what happens immediately before death,
which would be overlooked if one were not to use the exit and post-exit interviews. We include all of these
additional data. We describe our data work more in more detail in Online Appendix A.
C© 2017 The Authors. Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies
Who receives medicaid in old age? 15
3. Health
Although health is not, per se, a criteria to be eligible for Medicaid, Medicaid
provides good and services to the unhealthy based on various health measures.
For instance, to be eligible for a Medicaid nursing home, an individual needs
to satisfy criteria based on ADL impairments, and high medical expenses are
required to be medically eligible. Hence, we also describe the evolution of
FIGURE 3
Fraction of people with at least two ADL impairments who are single (upper panel)
and in couples (lower panel) after age 75, by age, cohort and permanent income
Note: The numbers refer to the PI tercile (1 = lowest; 2 = middle; 3 = richest). The thick, continuous
lines refer to the youngest cohort (born in 1920); the grey, dashed lines represent the middle cohort (born in
1913); the black, dotted lines represent the oldest cohort (born in 1906).
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health after age 75 for our subgroups. To do so, we look at three different
measures of health and we mainly report results on ADLs in this section. We
report more results on other health measures in Online Appendix D.
The ADL variable that we use is based on indicators of difficulties
performing six basic tasks: eating, dressing, walking across a room, getting in
and out of bed, bathing and using the toilet. We construct an indicator variabl,e
which is equal to 1 if the person has difficulties in performing two or more
ADLs, and we include data for the exit and post-exit interviews to complete the
period before death. Individuals with at least two ADLs are often considered
sufficiently disabled to be eligible for Medicaid nursing-home care assistance
(although the specific rules are complex and display some variability from
state to state).
The upper panel in Figure 3 displays the fraction of singles with at least
two ADL impairments after age 75, by age, cohort and permanent income. It
shows that the fraction of people with ADLs at age 76 is under 10 per cent for
all PI terciles, and that it increases fast by age, surpassing 50 per cent for those
who survive past age 95. A similar pattern holds for people in couples (lower
panel).
VI. Multivariate analysis: the role of Medicaid rules and other
observable factors
In this section, we first analyse the probability of receiving Medicaid in the
context of a descriptive multivariate analysis. Then, we use the regressions
results to study the implications of Medicaid rules, other observable factors,
and their interactions in determining Medicaid eligibility.
1. Multivariate logit regressions
To study the probability of receiving Medicaid, and its determinants in the
context of a descriptive multivariate analysis, we estimate a logistic probability
model, with a binary dependent variable equal to 1 if the individual is covered
by Medicaid, and zero otherwise.
We include a broad set of explanatory variables to identify the main factors
influencing the probability of receiving Medicaid. Starting from the variables
capturing the key Medicaid eligibility rules, we include a second-order
polynomial in PI percentile, which is the percentile of our measure of
permanent income, liquid wealth measured in 1996 (in hundreds of thousands
dollars), house wealth measured in 1996 (in hundreds of thousands dollars),
dummies for self-perceived health status (poor, fair, good and very good, with
the excluded category being excellent), a dummy indicating if the individual
has two ormoreADL impairments, and a dummy for being resident in a nursing
home in the current wave. In addition, we include a second-order polynomial
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in age, dummies for gender/marital status18 (single man, married woman
and single woman, with married man thus being the excluded category),19
number of children, a dummy for being white, regional dummies20 (Mid
Atlantic, EN Central, WN Central, S Atlantic, ES Central, WS Central and
Mountain, with New England excluded), dummies for own education (high-
school graduate, college and above, with the excluded category being lower
than high school), cohort dummies and a constant. We also experimented
with interactions between PI, initial wealth, family structure, being white and
other variables, finding statistically significant effects for the interactions of
PI with variables capturing health (self-reported health status, difficulties with
two or more ADLs, being resident in a nursing home), family structure, being
white, education and wealth (both initial liquid wealth and housing wealth).
Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis are shown in Online
Appendix E.
In Table 1, we present the average marginal effects for each variable
included. These are computed by leaving all the other explanatory variables at
their observed values, starting in column 1 with a specification that includes all
the variables just described. In column 2, we use a different variable to measure
nursing-home stays, which is the number of days in a nursing home in the last
two years. As the estimated specification includes many interactions terms,
in the table we report the average marginal effects for the variables included,
while in Online Appendix E we report the complete table of the coefficients.
The results in column 1 show that the PI percentile (our measure of permanent
income) has a large impact on the probability of receiving Medicaid and one
additional percentile reduces this probability, on average, by 0.43 percentage
points, where the average probability of receiving Medicaid is 16 per cent.
Conditional on the PI percentile, other significant variables capturing the rules
for eligibility include initial liquid and housing wealth, both with a (small)
negative effect, conditional on other factors, as they are measured in $100,000.
Liquid wealth has about the same impact on Medicaid recipiency as housing
wealth: on average, increasing liquid (housing) wealth by $100,000 reduces
18More specifically, being in a couple has some direct effects on Medicaid eligibility rules, but it is likely
that they are not meant to benefit either couples or singles, and thus they are neutral among the two groups.
In contrast, there are important reasons why being in a couple should be included in the other important
factors determining Medicaid recipiency. For instance, one of the spouses might take care of the other,
ailing, spouse and could thus postpone (or even avoid, in some cases), expensive nursing home stays – and
thus Medicaid recipiency. For these reasons, we interpret being in a couple as mainly belonging to other
factors rather than explicit Medicaid rules.
19Among the singles, 88 per cent are widowed, 4 per cent never married, and the rest are
separated/divorced. We also allow for a separate indicator for recently widowed men or women, which
turns out to be insignificant given the other variables already included in the analysis.
20Medicaid rules display some variation by state. We do not have state-level residency information, so it
is possible that some of our results by region might also capture some variation in the details of Medicaid
generosity at the state level.
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TABLE 1
Predictors of Medicaid recipiency: average marginal effects (resulting from
logistic estimates)
Regressor Specification 1 Specification 2
b/se b/se
PI percentile –0.0044∗∗∗ (0.00017) –0.0044∗∗∗ (0.00018)
Initial liquid wealth/100,000 –0.0525∗∗∗ (0.00590) –0.0524∗∗∗ (0.00603)
Initial housing wealth/100,000 –0.0474∗∗∗ (0.00786) –0.0458∗∗∗ (0.00803)
Self-reported health
Very good 0.0020 (0.01034) 0.0014 (0.00926)
Good 0.0108 (0.01018) 0.0110 (0.00908)
Fair 0.0192∗∗ (0.01040) 0.0176∗∗ (0.00930)
Poor 0.0179∗∗∗ (0.01058) 0.0221∗∗ (0.00964)
ADL 2+ 0.0633∗∗∗ (0.00616) 0.0644∗∗∗ (0.00622)
Nursing home
Yes 0.1537∗∗∗ (0.00904) –
Number of days – 0.0002∗∗∗ (0.00001)
Age 0.0023∗∗∗ (0.00047) 0.0020∗∗∗ (0.00045)
White –0.0389∗∗∗ (0.00801) –0.0357∗∗∗ (0.00788)
Family structure
Single man 0.0073 (0.00845) 0.0069 (0.00860)
Married woman 0.0145 (0.00999) 0.0124 (0.00996)
Single woman 0.0423∗∗∗ (0.00697) 0.0355∗∗∗ (0.00709)
Number of children 0.0056∗∗∗ (0.00113) 0.0049∗∗∗ (0.00109)
Census divisions
2. Mid Atlantic –0.0104 (0.01313) –0.0113 (0.01368)
3. EN Central –0.0404∗∗∗ (0.01296) –0.0380∗∗∗ (0.01359)
4. WN Central –0.0436∗∗∗ (0.01478) –0.0395∗∗∗ (0.01559)
5. South Atlantic –0.0246∗∗ (0.01246) –0.0249∗∗ (0.01313)
6. ES Central –0.0351∗∗ (0.01721) –0.0325∗∗ (0.01796)
7. WE Central 0.0052 (0.01326) 0.0054 (0.01376)
8. Mountain –0.0225 (0.01682) –0.0177 (0.01729)
9. Pacific 0.0401∗∗∗ (0.01480) 0.0420∗∗∗ (0.01545)
Education
2. High school –0.0231∗∗∗ (0.00592) –0.0217∗∗∗ (0.00591)
3. College –0.0708∗∗∗ (0.01375) –0.0573∗∗∗ (0.01327)
Cohort
Born in 1910–16 –0.0136∗∗ (0.00592) –0.0092∗ (0.00589)
Born in 1900–09 –0.0137 (0.00872) –0.0075 (0.00890)
N 29,753 27,771
Pseudo R2 0.395 0.396
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively. Clustered standard
errors (at the individual level) are given in parentheses.
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the probability of receiving Medicaid by about 0.52 (0.46) percentage points.
This may be surprising because, in many circumstances, an individual with
a home can be eligible for Medicaid, whereas an individual with more than
a small amount of liquid assets is not eligible.21 However, people run down
their housing wealth and rebalance their portfolios as they experience health
shocks and the death of a spouse.22 Thus, it is not surprising that these effects
are similar in the presence of optimising behaviour about the level and the
composition of savings.
Among the variables capturing health, reporting poor or fair health increases
the probability of receiving Medicaid by about 1.8 percentage points, on
average, compared to reporting excellent health. Having two or more ADL
impairments increases the probability by 6.4 percentage points, on average.
The dummy capturing current residency in a nursing home also has a large and
positive effect, on average, increasing the probability of receiving Medicaid
by 15 percentage points.
As for the other factors affectingMedicaid recipiency, older age, conditional
on the included covariates, increases the probability of receiving Medicaid,
with an average marginal effect of about 0.2 percentage points for every
additional year during retirement. As for family structure, we find that being
a single woman increases the probability of receiving Medicaid by about 3
percentage points, on average, relative to all other family structures. Being
white reduces this probability by 4 percentage points, on average, while the
number of children has a positive although small effect, with the probability
of receiving Medicaid increasing by 0.5 per cent for each additional child.
Census division turns out to be a significant predictor. We also include the
education level, which has a significant and negative effect, even conditional
on permanent income andwealth. For instance, having a college degree reduces
the probability of receiving Medicaid by almost 7 percentage points.
As residency in a nursing home proved to be an important factor determining
the probability of receiving Medicaid, we also re-estimate our model with the
number of days spent in a nursing home between two interviews, an indicator
that allows us to estimate whether longer stays tend to have a bigger impact
on the probability of receiving Medicaid. In column 2, we estimate the same
specification as in column 1, except that we capture the effect of nursing-home
stays by including the number of days spent in a nursing home between two
interviews. Itsmarginal effect is precisely estimated and indicates, for example,
that an increase of 100 days in a stay increases the probability of receiving
Medicaid by 2 percentage points, on average. The effect and significance of
all other variables are unchanged when using the number of days in a nursing
home rather than being in a nursing home.
21De Nardi et al., 2012.
22Poterba, Venti and Wise, 2010.
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2. Medicaid recipiency and themarginal effects of the rules and other observables
Our estimated model is non-linear and the marginal effects of the explanatory
variables are not constant over the range observed in the sample. To better
quantify our results, we start by showing the average predicted probability
of receiving Medicaid, plotted as a function of the variables that capture the
rules governing eligibility: permanent income and wealth. Then, we look at
the other observable factors and their interactions with various Medicaid rules,
including health.
To be more precise, we report the average predicted probabilities as a
function of that variable alone, with all other characteristics held constant.
More specifically, we take our sample of people and we apply their own other
observable characteristics and regression coefficients when one variable (e.g.
PI) is changed from the lowest to the highest level. Then, at each PI level, we
compute the average probability of receiving Medicaid, integrating over all
other characteristics other than the one that we are considering. The vertical
bars refer to the 95 per cent confidence interval. We use estimates from the
specification shown in column 2 of Table 1; figures plotted using coefficients
from column 1 are virtually identical.
Turning to Figure 4, the first point in the figure starting from the left, for
example, represents the average predicted probability of receiving Medicaid
as if everyone belonged to the first percentile of permanent income, while all
the other variables are at their observed values in the whole sample and then
averaged out across the sample. Subsequent points are computed in a similar
way. The figure shows that the average predicted probability of receiving
Medicaid is a negative function of PI, ranging from 28 per cent at the first
percentile, declining fast as PI increases, and reaching 2 per cent at the highest
PI percentile. The average marginal effect of PI is equal to 0.43 percentage
points for each percentile, as reported in 1: in terms of Figure 4, this marginal
effect is given by the difference between any two adjacent points in the curve
and is clearly not constant over the range of PI. Increasing PI from the first to the
tenth percentile, for example, reduces the probability of receiving Medicaid
by 6.3 percentage points, while when PI increases from the 50th to the 60th
percentile, the probability is reduced by 1.3 percentage points. The effect is
small but still sizeable even at the upper end of the distribution, where an
increase of PI from the 90th to the top percentile reduces the probability of
receiving Medicaid by half a percentage point. Similarly, in the lower panel
of Figure 4 we report the average predicted probability as a function of initial
housing wealth. The average predicted probability of receiving Medicaid turns
out to be 16 per cent for housing wealth equal to zero, and then declines
gradually with wealth to 2 per cent. The marginal effect, which on average
is about 0.5 percentage points every $100,000, is quite high at low values
of wealth, with the difference in the probability of receiving Medicaid being
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FIGURE 4
Effect of PI (upper panel) and of housing wealth (lower panel) on the probability of
receiving Medicaid
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Note: Average predicted probability of Medicaid receipt, using the estimates in Table 1, holding all other
variables at their observed values.
5 percentage points when initial housing wealth increases from $0 to $100,000,
about 0.5 percentage points between $500,000 and $600,000, and negligible
after that amount.
Figure 5 shows the pattern of the average predicted probability of receiving
Medicaid by health and age. In the upper panel, the probability of receiving
Medicaid is plotted as a function of the number of nights spent in a nursing home
over the previous two years. The average predicted probability of receiving
Medicaid is, on average, 13 per cent when the number of nights is equal to
zero, and this grows to 38 per cent when the number of nights is 730, or two
years. In the lower panel, the probability of receiving Medicaid is plotted as a
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FIGURE 5
Effect of the number of nights in a nursing home (upper panel) and age (lower panel)
on the probability of receiving Medicaid
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Note: Average predicted probability of Medicaid receipt, using the estimates in Table 1, holding all other
variables at their observed values.
function of age. The average probability is also increasing in age, increasing
from about 12 per cent at age 72 to 19 per cent at age 100.
Our estimates have shown that the interactions between PI percentile,
health and other characteristics are quantitatively important. To analyse these
interactions, Figure 6 plots the predicted probabilities as a function of both PI
percentile and ADL impairments (upper panel) or PI percentile and the number
of nights spent in a nursing home (lower panel). The marginal effect of having
two or more ADLs is given by the difference in the two functions plotted in the
upper panel of Figure 6. Especially at low income percentiles, the effect of this
variable is sizeable, increasing the predicted probability of receiving Medicaid
from 26 to 35 per cent. Although, at the upper end of the permanent income
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FIGURE 6
Effect of ADLs (upper panel) and the number of nights in a nursing home (lower
panel) on the probability of receiving Medicaid, as a function of PI percentile
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Note: Average predicted probability of Medicaid receipt, using the estimates in Table 1, holding all other
variables at their observed values.
distribution, its effect is much smaller in absolute terms (e.g. it increases the
probability of receiving Medicaid by 2.5 percentage points at the 8th decile and
by 2 percentage points thereafter), the effect is still precisely estimated. Thus,
it implies that the probability of receiving Medicaid doubles in the presence of
two or more ADLs.
In the lower panel of Figure 6, we plot the effect of the number of nights
spent in a nursing home during the last two years on the probability of receiving
Medicaid, for three values: zero nights, 365 nights and 730 nights, or two years.
The average predicted probability when the number of nights spent in a nursing
home is zero goes from 27 per cent at the lowest PI percentile to 2 per cent at
C© 2017 The Authors. Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies
24 Fiscal Studies
FIGURE 7
Effect of family structure (upper panel) and of race (lower panel) on the probability
of receiving Medicaid, as a function of PI decile
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Note: Average predicted probability of Medicaid receipt, using the estimates in Table 1, holding all other
variables at their observed values.
the highest PI percentile. When the number of nights spent in a nursing home
is 365, the average predicted probability of receiving Medicaid increases to
32 per cent at the lowest PI percentile and to 22 per cent at the 30th PI percentile.
For stays that are as long as two years, the average predicted probability
increases dramatically, reaching 37 per cent at the lowest PI percentile, 44 per
cent at the 30th percentile and 13 per cent at the 80th percentile. Hence, longer
stays in a nursing home substantially increase the probability of receiving
Medicaid. This effect is especially large between the 2nd and 8th PI deciles.
We also show the average predicted probabilities by permanent income
and variables capturing other factors that influence the probability of receiving
Medicaid. In Figure 7, we start with the effect of family structure on the
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FIGURE 8
Effect of education (upper panel) and region (lower panel) on the probability of
receiving Medicaid, as a function of PI decile
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Note: Average predicted probability of Medicaid receipt, using the estimates in Table 1, holding all other
variables at their observed values.
probability of receiving Medicaid. The marginal effect of being a single
woman, relative to the reference category of being a married man, is the
difference between the two functions. As is apparent from the figure, being
a single woman (statistically) significantly raises the probability of receiving
Medicaid, with respect to the reference category, but only in the three lowest
PI deciles. In the lowest PI percentile, the probability of receiving Medicaid
is 0.24 for married men and 0.32 for single women. Conditional on the other
covariates included in the analysis, gender and family structure influence the
probability of receiving Medicaid only at low PI percentiles, while the effect
vanishes at higher percentiles.
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In the lower panel of Figure 7, we plot the predicted probability of receiving
Medicaid by race: themarginal effect of beingwhite (i.e. the difference between
the two functions) is zero at the first PI percentile, 2 percentage points at the
20th percentile, and it increases to about 5 percentage points in the upper half
of the distribution of permanent income. It is surprising that this effect is only
active at higher PI percentiles.
Lastly, in Figure 8, we analyse the effect of education and Census division.
In the upper panel, we plot the predicted probabilities as a function of PI
and education. The difference between having no high-school degree and
having a high-school or college degree is very large in the first two PI deciles.
In particular, at the first PI percentile, having a college degree reduces the
probability of receiving Medicaid by 13 percentage points with respect to not
having any degree.
In the lower panel of Figure 8, we plot the predicted probabilities as a
function of three Census divisions that cover the range of possible effects:
New England, West North (WN) central (which includes the Dakotas and
Missouri) and Pacific. Other divisions are included in the range drawn by WN
Central and New England, with the exception of West South (WS) Central
(which includes Texas and Louisiana), which lies between New England and
Pacific, and these are not shown for clarity. The effect of Census division is
decreasing with PI decile, and it is at its peak at the first percentile, where
the difference in the predicted probability between being resident in the WN
Central division and the Pacific division is 28 percentage points.
VII. Conclusions
We use HRS data to study the evolution and possible determinants ofMedicaid
recipiency of US households during retirement. In particular, we ask how
the Medicaid rules for elderly individuals map into the reality of Medicaid
recipiency, and we explore what other observable characteristics have an
important role in determining programme participation.
Our descriptive analysis uncovers several interesting findings. First, even at
higher percentiles of permanent income, the Medicaid recipiency rate is high
for elderly survivors. Second, in the raw data, couples are less likely to end
up receiving Medicaid than singles, especially at higher permanent income
levels. Third, the evolution of health by age and permanent income is similar
for singles and couples. Fourth, impairments related to having difficulties in
at least two basic ADLs grow fast with age after age 75 and display much less
variation in permanent income than self-perceived bad health. Fifth, people
living in a couple are much less likely to experience long stays in a nursing
home than singles or to have two or more ADL impairments in old age.
Then, we study how the probability of receiving Medicaid is influenced
by demographic, economic and health factors, using a logit probability
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model to quantify the various effects. The PI percentile has a large impact
on the probability of receiving Medicaid: one additional percentile reduces
this probability, on average, by 0.4 percentage points. Conditional on PI
percentile, other significant variables include initial liquid and housing
wealth; these findings are consistent with the nature of Medicaid eligibility
rules.
Permanent income also explains much of the difference in Medicaid
recipiency between singles and couples. In fact, holding other factors constant,
single women are only 4 percentage points more likely to receive Medicaid
than people in other family structures. Health status also has a large impact:
compared to being in good or better health, being in fair or poor health increases
the probability of receiving Medicaid by 2 percentage points, on average.
Having two or more ADL impairments increases the probability of receiving
Medicaid by 6 percentage points on average, while those currently residing in
a nursing home are 15 percentage points more likely to receive Medicaid than
other groups.
Our analysis also shows that the interaction of permanent income and other
observables related to Medicaid eligibility is important. For example, we find
that having two or more limitations in ADLs increases the probability of
receiving Medicaid much more in absolute terms at the lower end of the PI
distribution, while its relative increase is largest for people in the upper part
of the distribution. In terms of the effects of being in a nursing home and its
interaction with permanent income, people in the 50th to 70th PI percentiles
who spend two years in a nursing home are up to nine times more likely to be
receiving Medicaid than people with the same permanent income who are not
in a nursing home. At the 90th percentile of permanent income, this increase
levels off to a factor of two times, compared to people not in a nursing home
for two years.
Relatively few studies have investigated the insurance role of Medicaid in
old age among middle- and higher-income retirees.23 De Nardi, French and
Jones (2016a) focus on singles retirees and find that the rich, by being more
likely to live longer, face a higher risk of catastrophic medical expenses at very
old ages. As a consequence, they find that Medicaid offers valuable insurance
to single individuals in the highest PI deciles.
Our analysis highlights many factors that are important determinants of
Medicaid recipiency. In addition, we find that individuals in the upper half
of the PI distribution, both singles and couples, and conditional on a large
set of observables, have a non-negligible probability of ending up receiving
Medicaid, particularly if they face health problems or long stays in a nursing
home.
23Brown and Finkelstein, 2008; De Nardi et al., 2016a.
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